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Abstract 
 
 
During the last decade the development of the banking sectors in CEC5 countries was 
greatly determined by increasing presence of foreign banks. Foreign banks played a 
significant role in privatising, re-capitalising and modernising the banking sectors in 
the region. In this sense they contributed to stability. However the exceptionally high 
level of foreign ownership also raised concerns whether foreign banks threaten 
stability by propagating shocks outside the host country, doing cherry-picking or 
putting too much pressure on already troubled domestic banks. This paper summarises 
the empirical evidence on those issues. Our major contribution is the presentation of 
CEC5 countries’ experiences based on the up-to-date and rich information provided 
by individual case studies of the involved central banks. We outline the motives 
behind the entry of foreign banks, compare their performance relative to their 
domestic peers. By summarising the latest development in EU countries, we also 
highlight the differences between them and the accession CEC5 countries. 
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I. Introduction 
 
As a consequence of the bank failures of the early 1930s, the banking industry 
became heavily regulated with serious entry barriers in the aftermath of the Great 
Depression. These barriers remained almost unchanged until the early 1980s. From 
the 1980s on, however, we have witnessed extensive liberalisation and integration of 
banking markets. In certain regions (in particular in Latin America and Central and 
Eastern Europe) foreign penetration has reached unprecedented levels. This paper 
focuses on the CEC5 countries, where the process of internationalisation has some 
peculiarities, which make comparison with earlier experiences difficult. At the end of 
the 1980s, after the collapse of socialist ‘planned’ economies, these countries began to 
develop market economies. There was a need to create the institutions of a market 
economy in a liberalised international financial environment. Moreover, the 
transformation crisis caused the depreciation of domestic capital including that of the 
banking sector as well. The accumulation of capital and development of know-how 
intensive banking infrastructure required strong involvement of foreign capital. 
 
With the exception of Slovenia, the banking sectors of the CEC5 countries are now 
dominated by foreign banks. At the same time, there is a noticeable trend of 
integration on the Single European Banking market as well. Nevertheless, the role of 
foreign banks is much less dominant than in the accession countries. 
 
The next section presents an overview of the role of foreign banks in countries with 
less-developed financial systems. In this section, we analyse the benefits and costs of 
foreign bank entry and the financial stability aspects of the foreign bank presence. 
International experiences of the impact of foreign bank penetration on the domestic 
banking sector are also reviewed. The third part analyses the transformation of 
financial systems in the CEC5 countries, with special regard to the motivations, 
characteristics and role of foreign banks. This overview builds on the country studies 
prepared by the CEC5 central banks as well. The role of foreign banks in the EU is 
markedly different than in the CEC5. Accordingly, the fourth section outlines the 
current state and recent trends in foreign banking on the Single European Market 
which the CEC5 countries will soon be joining. The final section presents the 
conclusions. 
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II. The role of foreign banks - experiences of less-developed countries 
 
During the last decade there was a substantial increase in foreign bank penetration 
both in terms of its extent and the number of countries involved. The two regions 
mainly affected are Latin America and the transition countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe.1 This section aims to summarise the findings of various empirical studies, 
which consider the impact of foreign entry on the domestic banks and the banking 
system in general. We focus on the experiences of developing countries, which are 
more relevant to CEC5 countries. The experiences of developed countries are used 
rather to highlight the differences between developed and developing countries.2 
 
We are mainly interested in financial stability, which is affected by foreign entry 
through various channels: its impact on competition and efficiency, on capital flows 
(quantity, structure and volatility), and on institutional capacity (transparency, 
regulation and supervision, market infrastructure).3 Although there are debates 
regarding the degree of competition desirable in banking in general, and the 
relationship between competition and stability, developing countries usually do suffer 
from a lack of competition and low efficiency. Supposedly, foreign entry enhances 
competition and increase efficiency, they are likely to benefit in terms of stability. As 
for capital flows, financial stability is less threatened when capital flows are less 
volatile, have a balanced maturity structure and their level is manageable. As for 
institutional capacity (as defined by Kono and Schuknecht (2000)) its improvement 
undoubtedly contributes to financial stability. Thus, testing the effect of foreign entry 
on stability can be complemented indirectly, investigating its impact on competition, 
institutional capacity and capital flows. Empirical studies focus on the first and the 
third aspects. 
 
                                                          
1 Emerging markets in Asia are exceptions, as they did not experience a similar increase in foreign 
bank penetration. 
2 Even within the developing category it is necessary to differentiate between middle and low income 
countries, the latter ones being less relevant for emerging CEC countries. See Claessens and Lee 
(2002). 
3 The relationship between financial service trade and financial sector stability is discussed in Kono and 
Schuknecht (2000). 
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Before reviewing the relevant literature it is necessary to clarify some concepts and 
point out the major issues arising in the empirical investigation of the impact of 
foreign bank entry. 
 
Although most of the studies refer to foreign entry, we prefer to use the wider concept 
of internationalization. In relation to banking this refers to the involvement of foreign 
banks - without discrimination - in the provision of financial services either through 
cross-border or via foreign bank entry. The concept of foreign bank penetration is also 
used with the same meaning. Foreign bank entry is defined as the presence of a 
foreign bank in a host country, either as a subsidiary or as a branch. 
 
The literature reviewed is rather mixed in this respect. Most of the papers concentrate 
on foreign bank entry, however some papers include cross-border lending as well. 
Although not always highlighted, each form has its own characteristics and 
implications for financial stability. For example, cross-border lending tends to be 
biased toward short-term lending and more responsive to home country shocks than 
physical presence. Its customer base is limited to multinational or large enterprises. 
Kono and Schuknecht (2000) also suggest that physical presence (they call it 
commercial presence) can better contribute to financial stability due to its stronger 
impact on efficiency and capacity building and less distorted capital flows. Although 
it may be somewhat less important, there also may be a need to differentiate between 
branches and subsidiaries. These are typically involved in different bank services, 
with different implications for their relative performance and impact on domestic 
banks. 
 
The papers also range widely in terms of the methods employed (case studies versus 
cross country analysis), the data used (aggregate versus individual bank balance sheet 
data, survey data on foreign banks), the countries reviewed (Latin American, 
transition countries, South-European, developed and developing countries) and time 
periods covered. Methodological diversity is also present, including cross-tables, 
regressions, and the stochastic frontier approach. Different proxies are used for the 
dependent variables (measure of foreign penetration as share in number or assets or 
liabilities, whether offshore lending is included or not). Even the definition of 
‘foreign’ (minimum percentage of foreign ownership: 10, 30, 50 or 70%) varies, as 
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well as the range of control variables (macro, regulatory, banking structure, etc.). The 
hypotheses tested are also different. This diversity makes it difficult to compare the 
papers to each other and to draw general conclusions. 
 
One of the major problems researchers face when investigating the experiences of 
developing countries is the difficulty of disentangling the impact of banking reforms, 
the broader process of liberalisation and the transition process and the opening up of 
the sector. Moreover, the availability of quality data and the length of the time series 
pose additional difficulties. One must also be very careful to take into account the 
effect of other than foreign presence variables. Accordingly, when the performance of 
foreign banks versus domestic banks is compared or the impact of opening up is 
estimated, one must include all the relevant control variables. For example, 
profitability and cost efficiency depend on the macro environment (GDP growth, 
inflation), on the structure of the banking sector (concentration), bank specific 
variables (activity, size), and on other liberalisation measures aside from foreign 
entry. Furthermore, there are also country-specific issues that need to be dealt with in 
the empirical work (e.g. extremely high inflation in Turkey, government ownership). 
 
Because of the nature of this short literature review, only the findings and the general 
picture emerging from those findings are outlined. However, the reader should bear in 
mind the caveats and the diversity of approaches found in the literature. 
 
II.1. Why do foreign banks enter? 
 
There are various hypotheses to explain why banks expand their activity abroad. The 
first such theory introduced into the literature by Williams (1997, 2002) is called the 
defensive expansion hypothesis. This claims that multinational banks follow their 
clients abroad (either their trade or investment). Information about the client is one of 
the main assets of banks. There is, however, no external market for this information, 
i.e. markets where banks could sell this knowledge. Hence, they have to follow their 
client if they do not want to loose them. Often the motivation behind following the 
client is not so much to earn more profit but rather to avoid loss at existing locations. 
On the other hand, it is also in the interest of the clients, who must bear the 
transaction costs of changing banks. Although defensive expansion is found to have 
strong explanatory power in more developed countries, it only provides a partial 
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explanation. Williams refers to other hypotheses such as regulatory impact, home 
market sophistication, etc. Banks who follow their clients might restrict their activity 
to their existing client base, but they can also create a beachhead (see Williams) and 
try to acquire new clients or enter into other market segments in the host country. 
Their relative performance and impact on the domestic banking sector is largely 
determined by which strategy they follow. 
 
In developing countries the defensive expansion hypothesis is suggested to have even 
less importance. The underlying motivation is also rather different. Whereas in 
developed countries banks’ primarily motive is to keep existing clients, here the need 
for effective monitoring becomes more important. Financial markets are less 
developed and mature, the only way to ensure effective monitoring is physical 
presence. Delegation of monitoring is not an option. 
 
An alternative and more important explanation for developing countries is the 
existence of host country opportunities (see for example Clarke et al. (2001)). Banks 
enter other, non-saturated and less developed, less efficient markets where they enjoy 
comparative advantages – higher quality services, better risk management tools etc. 
Such markets often offer good profit and growth prospects. Typically, these markets 
also entail risks not present in developed countries. Therefore, the entry decision is 
influenced by other factors, such as the development of market infrastructure, 
standards of regulation and supervision, and political risk. Often foreign banks are 
attracted by tax relieves and other regulatory exemptions. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned “pull” factors, there are other factors, which “push” 
banks abroad. Amongst others, Clarke et al. mentions deregulation in the home 
country (which, for example, pushed Spanish banks to enter Latin American markets), 
as well as the size and efficiency of the entering bank. 
 
 
II.2. Why do countries open up their markets? 
 
Typically, the opening up of home markets is part of a broader liberalisation process. 
In addition, it is often driven by the need for capital and also for expertise during 
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privatisation or following a banking crisis. It is regarded as an important way of 
importing knowledge and enhancing competition. 
The decision on opening up is based on thorough consideration of its costs and 
benefits. Benefits cited in relation to developing countries are numerous. It is 
expected that foreign banks contribute to building a more efficient and resilient 
financial system by introducing and spreading technology, providing new services 
and products, raising standards and practices, by exerting competitive pressure on 
domestic banks and increasing the efficiency of resource allocation. Increased 
competition lowers the cost of intermediation and leads to cheaper credit for 
borrowers (see Haas and Lelyveld). It can even lead to stronger regulation and 
supervision.4 During turbulent times, foreign banks can also provide a “safe haven” 
for depositors and a stable source of funds compared to domestic banks (see Peek and 
Rosengren). Foreign banks might attract other foreign investors in the non-bank 
sector. On the cost side, Hindley for example summarises the counterarguments under 
the headings of economic and regulatory. Among the former ones are the followings: 
domestic banks need time to mature (the so-called infant industry argument); 
newcomers can engage in cherry picking; in contrast to existing banks they do not 
have bad loans, and hence a level playing field is not ensured; a lack of commitment 
to the local economy might cause capital flight. On the other hand, there are fears that 
regulators cannot control foreign banks properly. Others add to this list (Claessen) the 
loss of monetary autonomy and increased volatility of capital flows. There are also 
concerns that foreign banks ignore certain markets segment (SMEs) or propagate 
shocks originating from their home country. 
 
II.3. The impact of foreign banks 
 
First of all, the impact of foreign bank penetration on the domestic banking sector 
depends on its mode (offshore lending versus physical presence), the underlying 
motivation (following clients versus home country opportunities), and the scope of 
their activity (wholesale versus retail). If banks enter the market to follow their 
clients, they are not expected to outperform domestic banks or have a substantial 
impact on the entire banking industry. On the other hand, when banks enter a range of 
market niches to exploit their comparative advantages they are sure to trigger 
competitive pressure on domestic banks. However, this effect may be limited to the 
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market segment in which they are present. It may also happen that foreign entrants 
provide new, previously non-existent services in the host country, which contributes 
to better services, but does not exert competitive pressure on their domestic peers. 
 
In general, the studies test different hypotheses on the potential costs and benefits of 
foreign entry or presence. The most important issues investigated are discussed in the 
following sections. 
 
II.3.1. The relative performance of foreign banks and their impact 
 
Most of the studies find that in developing countries foreign banks outperform their 
domestic peers. Their activity mix also differs, as they usually concentrate on new 
services and the wholesale market, where they enjoy comparative advantages. There 
is also strong evidence highlighting their beneficial impact on the level of competition 
and efficiency – even after controlling for other influencing factors. It should be 
noted, however, that this effect is often limited to the relevant market segments. 
 
There is often a fear that foreign banks put too much pressure on already troubled 
domestic banks (especially when opening up take place in turbulent times, when 
capital is most needed), as alluded to with the infant industry reasoning mentioned 
above. However, most of the evidence on Latin America shows a weak presence of 
foreign banks in certain areas (such as retail banking) where domestic banks have 
comparative advantages. Furthermore, several case studies prove that domestic banks 
are able to meet the challenges and to become more competitive, to enter into new 
services (see Abel and Bonin, Pastor et al.). Moreover, the increased competitive 
pressure on domestic banks is related to the whole liberalisation process, not to a 
single element (opening up) of it. 
 
To start with individual country cases, for Spain Pastor et al. (2000) find evidence of a 
positive effect of foreign presence on margins, overhead costs and profitability only in 
those segments of the domestic market where they competed. Spain is one of the few 
EU countries where foreign penetration is rather high (mainly in terms of number). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
4 See for example Claessens et. al (2000) and Levine (1996). 
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Clarke et al. (2000) find that, compared to domestic banks, foreign banks in Argentina 
typically have better quality loan portfolios, are more profitable and efficient, and 
lend more to sectors where they have comparative advantages (manufacturing). They 
also found evidence of increased competitive pressure (declining margins and profits), 
but only in those market segments where foreign banks were present. 
 
Barajas et al. considers the case of Columbia. Here, foreign banks are characterised by 
less non-performing loans and higher productivity. They also find strong evidence of 
increased competitive pressure induced by foreign bank entry. Although increased 
domestic competition due to financial liberalisation had an even stronger impact. As a 
result, intermediation spreads came under pressure, the loan quality of domestic banks 
deteriorated, and cost productivity improved. Evidence of the beneficial effect of 
foreign bank entry is strong. But the authors also highlight the importance of 
controlling for other elements of liberalisation. Without it, the role of foreign banks 
might be overstated. 
 
Denizer (2000) presents evidence on Turkey, which also supports the benefits of 
opening up in terms of competition and efficiency. Competition intensified mostly in 
areas where foreign banks were involved (trade finance, corporate finance, etc.). The 
authors also point out the qualitative impact of foreign banks in banking procedures 
and standards. 
 
Majnoni et al. (2003) show that in Hungary the profitability gain of foreign banks 
depends on the duration of their presence and the mode of entry. Lower cost of credit, 
induced by foreign bank penetration, becomes a benefit only years after entry. 
 
Turning to cross country analyses, in a very comprehensive study of 80 countries 
Claessen et al. show that foreign banks in developing countries do outperform 
domestic banks both in terms of profitability and cost efficiency. However, that is not 
true for developed countries. This evidence supports the argument about different 
motivations for entry in developing versus developed countries. They also find 
evidence of the role of foreign banks in enhancing competition–leading to lower 
profitability and margins of domestic banks. The relationship was significant when 
foreign presence was defined as a share in number, but not for share in assets, 
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implying that the number of foreign banks is more important than their size in 
triggering competition. 
 
Papi and Revolta (2000) focus on 27 transition economies. They argue that transition 
countries are special cases, where all the arguments for foreign entry are highly 
relevant. The potential benefits for the host countries are significant; they have strong 
trade links with developed countries; political and economic stability is satisfactory, 
etc. Their approach is unique, in that they also include banks with minority foreign 
stakeholders (at least 10% of foreign equity capital), however they exclude branches. 
They obtained similar results to those previously found for developing countries, both 
regarding the differences between foreign and domestic banks and the impact of 
foreign presence. 
 
A paper on transition countries by Bol et al. (2002) reaches the same conclusion. 
Based on data for 12 transition countries, they conclude that on average foreign banks 
are more profitable and efficient than domestic banks. However, the performance of 
the two groups tends to converge. 
 
Hasan and Marton (2003) use stochastic frontier approach to investigate profit and 
cost inefficiency of individual Hungarian banks between 1993 and 1998. Their results 
show lower inefficiency of foreign-owned banks and an improving trend for the entire 
banking sector. Another paper on Hungary, Kiraly et al., using the same approach, 
finds mixed results. Only one group of foreign banks was significantly more efficient. 
In their cross country analysis Green et al. (2003) estimate economies of scale and 
scope for CEE transition countries. They find a reasonable level of efficiency. 
However, there is no evidence on foreign banks being more efficient than domestic 
ones.5 
 
The results for transition countries seem to be more mixed than those for Latin 
American countries. One reason for the mixed results could be that in the observed 
period the transformation of banking industry was still in progress. Furthermore, we 
know from other experience that foreign banks need some time to outperform 
                                                          
5 Despite its sophisticated methodology we regard a major shortcoming of their paper, that the foreign 
dummies they use do not vary across years. The authors admit it, but they do not see this as a serious 
problem. However, during the observed period (1995-1999) ownership of banks changed dramatically 
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domestic banks. Privatised banks also had to undergo reorganisation and IT 
investment, which pushes costs up during the first years. Many papers on transition 
countries do not control for other important explanatory variables (size, activity mix, 
macro variables, etc.). The quality of the data is also troublesome. 
 
II.3.2. Lending to SMEs 
 
There is a concern that foreign banks can engage in cherry picking and might neglect 
certain market segments (in particular small- and medium-sized enterprises, SMEs) in 
their lending activity. Physical, cultural and information distance can further 
aggravate this problem. The Latin American experiences do not seem to support this 
concern. CEE experiences are very limited, for SME financing is rather 
underdeveloped in those countries. 
 
There is empirical evidence that large banks face disadvantages in providing 
relationship lending (for typically small, informationally opaque businesses).6 
Accordingly, small businesses account for a lower share in their asset portfolio, 
compared to smaller banks. This is true for both developed and developing countries.7 
Since foreign banks tend to be large, they are expected to follow this pattern. Berger 
et al. (2001) find that in Argentina small businesses tend to get fewer loans from large 
and foreign banks. However, bank distress does not hurt them more than large 
borrowers. Berger et al. also suggest, that there may be positive external effects of 
M&A or foreign entry. Due to increased competition, other small local banks can be 
forced to target small businesses. Hence, their overall loan supply does not change. 
 
Clarke et al. (2002) studies the case of Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Peru. In all 
four countries there is a significant difference in lending to small businesses between 
large and small domestic banks. The authors also compare domestic versus foreign 
banks according to their size. Although the share of SMEs is smaller on average at 
foreign banks, large foreign banks lend more to SMEs in Chile and Colombia. The 
growth rate of SME loans was also larger in case of larger foreign banks relative to 
their domestic peers. The reason behind this could be that changes in technology 
                                                                                                                                                                      
in most of the countries. 
6 See Berger et al. (2001). 
7 See the review in Clarke et al. (2001). 
 13
 
 
(credit scoring) lower the obstacles to lending small businesses by large and/or 
foreign banks. 
 
Clarke et al. (2001) employ survey data on 38 developing countries. They use 
information on borrowers’ perception about access to long-term loans. They find a 
positive relationship between the extent of foreign bank penetration and access to 
credit. Even small enterprises find interest rates and access to credit less a constraint 
on their operation and growth prospects when foreign presence is strong. Large 
enterprises do however seem to benefit more. 
 
II.3.3. Foreign banks’ behaviour during crises 
 
Another concern is that foreign banks might be more responsive to shocks originating 
from the host country and could also propagate shocks originating from outside the 
host country (from either the home or a third country where the parent bank has 
interests). Others argue that foreign banks tend to have diversified portfolios. 
Therefore, they are less prone to shocks in the host country, and can provide more 
stable funding during turbulent times. 
 
The overall evidence is inconclusive. There are signs of transmitting external and 
portfolio shocks to host countries. However, such transmission varies across home 
countries and levels of exposure in a host country. On the positive side, foreign 
lending seems to be less responsive to host country shocks. There is no evidence of 
the feared procyclicality of foreign claims. Claims of foreign subsidiaries are not 
procyclical, but cross-border claims are more responsive to host country shocks. 
Regarding the net impact on the stability of lending, most of the papers suggest a 
rather positive role of foreign banks. Nevertheless, this is an area where future 
research is much needed. 
 
Most of the studies focus on Latin American countries, which are particularly well 
suited for investigating that issue. During the 1990s many of these countries 
experienced the largest increase in foreign bank penetration and were also hit by 
economic downturns and crises. 
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As for spill-over of home and third country shocks, most of the papers find some 
evidence of this. Goldberg (2001) uses micro data of US banks’ foreign claims in 
several countries. In case of Latin America, US bank claims are positively correlated 
with US GDP growth,8 which show spillover of home country shocks. However, they 
argue that this is likely to occur without the presence of US banks. Moreover US 
banks are not volatile lenders–not even following international financial crises. As for 
host country shocks, US lending is not responsive to them. Thus, on the whole, they 
rather have a stabilising role in lending. 
 
Peek and Rosengren (2000) investigate the behaviour of foreign lending after crises in 
a sample of three Latin American countries (Argentina, Mexico and Brazil). The 
authors find that financial crises did not cause foreign banks to cut back onshore 
lending. Being diversified, they are less affected by problems arising in the host 
countries. Interestingly, they rather increased their presence after crises by acquiring 
troubled domestic banks. By contrast, offshore lending tended to decrease in turbulent 
periods. They also highlight the measurement problems associated with foreign 
penetration. The inclusion or exclusion of cross-border claims, of non-BIS reporting 
banks, measures based on claims or deposits provide different pictures. But none 
support the hypothesis on foreign banks withdrawing from troubled countries. 
 
The most comprehensive study is that of Peria et al., covering 10 Latin American 
countries and their 7 most important foreign lenders. They find further evidence that 
home country conditions do have an impact on foreign claims, although the 
magnitude varies across countries. Furthermore, as foreign presence becomes more 
important than cross-border lending, foreign banks become less responsive to external 
and portfolio shocks. In respect of host country shocks, these claims do not react 
excessively to such events. In addition, the larger the overall exposure in a given 
country, the less responsive – and less procyclical - banks are to shocks in that 
country. They are also more sensitive to positive than negative shocks. 
 
The only study, which investigates the relationship between foreign bank penetration 
and bank credit stability in CEE countries, is that of Haas and Lelyveld (2002). Their 
results are very similar to the Latin American experiences. Although cross-border 
                                                          
8 However, this is not true for Asian emerging countries. 
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credits did decline in periods of host country difficulties, this was usually offset by 
expansion in foreign bank subsidiaries. 
 
III. Foreign banks in CEC5 
 
III.1. The motivations of foreign banking in CEC5 
 
This section reviews the motivations which led the CEC5 to open their banking 
markets to foreign banking institutions, and the market and regulatory incentives that 
encouraged foreign banks to enter the banking markets of the CEC5. In analysing 
these motivating factors, we will evaluate the experiences of the CEC5 on the basis of 
the academic literature reviewed in the previous section. 
 
For the CEC5, opening their markets for foreign banks represented the only possible 
way of creating an efficient banking system providing services that could meet 
international standards. Lack of domestic capital and expertise was made apparent by 
the massive losses of capital following the implementation of the two-tier banking 
systems and the subsequent transformation crisis. This could only be remedied by 
allowing foreign banks to establish business in the region. Under the circumstances, 
the advantages of opening the banking market appreciated. Opening up the banking 
markets was not decided upon after careful consideration of the advantages and 
disadvantages. Rather, it resulted from the realisation that a banking sector, well-
equipped with capital, capable of offering state-of-the-art services and introducing a 
business attitude characterising the advanced market economies, cannot be created 
without reaping these advantages. Market opening did indeed bring all these 
advantages, thus contributing significantly to financial stability in the CEC5. 
 
However, one of the typical disadvantages of market opening is cherry picking: 
powerful foreign banks, selling more sophisticated services and often unburdened by 
inherited non-performing loans, can easily acquire the best clients carrying the lowest 
risks, and thus they make it more difficult for the domestic banking systems to gain 
strength and compete with foreign banks. Possibly, this is one of the reasons why 
involving foreign owners meant the only way for domestic banks to gain more power 
and remain in the market. This also might be one of the reasons why the share of 
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foreign banks reached exceptionally high level in CEC5 countries. Of the 
disadvantages, the sensitivity to the economic cycles of home countries has not or 
only scarcely been observed. For example, although German bank owners facing 
difficulties tightened control of their Hungarian subsidiaries and enhanced cost 
management, they did not curtail business activities or withdraw capital. 
 
Market and regulatory factors both motivated foreign banks' entry into the market. 
The business strategy of foreign banks followed a similar pattern in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland. In the early stage of market entry, some signs of the 
defensive expansion hypothesis were demonstrable, as the core business of foreign 
banks was to serve the clients of their home country. However, the main motivation 
behind this strategy was not to maintain existing clients, but rather to offer them the 
same services as they were offered in the home market. At that time, the other target 
clients were the most solvent large domestic companies. 
 
Later, taking advantage of market opportunities became the major motivating factor. 
In the CEC5, the volume of banking services is significantly lower than in advanced 
countries. As the stabilisation of economies was followed by the transformation crisis, 
the retail and SME markets in CEC5 had significant growth potential, thus orientation 
towards the SME and retail markets became clearer from the late 1990s. Accordingly, 
the strategic investors of large local banks, in line with the inherited clientele of 
privatised banks, had a significantly wider scope of activity, namely, their business 
orientation gradually extended to SMEs and the retail sector. Lending to households 
and SMEs has now become one of the most important driving forces behind market 
growth. 
 
During the 1990s, regulation of the banking sector in the CEC5 gradually approached 
the relevant international standards. As each of the five countries will join the EU in 
2004, alignment with the effective banking legislation of the EU will have to have 
been completed by that time at the latest. Meanwhile, international banking legislation 
has also undergone radical changes since the early 1990s. Ever since the Basel 
Committee established the first capital adequacy ratio at 8% in 1988, banking 
regulations have had a clear-cut trend of development. Rigorous rules expressed in the 
fixed “magic figures” are increasingly being replaced by banking regulations based on 
 17
 
 
internationally accepted standards that make allowances for the peculiar features and 
standards of risk management, and fit the risk profiles of the individual banks. 
Actually, the very first step towards this goal was the elaboration of the 8% capital 
adequacy ratio, which is far more adjusted to the banks’ risk profiles than the 
previously applied leverage ratio. The 1996 Basel recommendation on the capital 
accord to incorporate market risks was a major move forward, as it allowed the 
application of audited internal models in relation to market risks, provided that such 
models had been accepted by the Supervision. Then further progress was made in the 
Basel Committee’s 25 Core Principles of Effective Banking Supervision regarding the 
assessment of the efficiency of supervision. These developments reached their climax 
with the Basel II capital requirements resting on a structure of 3 pillars, which clearly 
require that regulation and supervision be based on co-operation with the banks and 
an analysis of the risks involved.9 
 
With regard to the regulation of foreign banks’ activities, it is clear that in the early 
1990s the CEC5 offered a far more favourable regulatory environment for foreign 
banks than their own home countries did, as these countries only gradually brought 
their regulations into alignment with international standards (e.g. in terms of credit 
risk capital requirements, market risk capital requirements, large exposure limits or 
consolidated regulation). Moreover, as banking supervisions were newly founded, 
they had little experience, and this entailed less strict supervision than in their home 
countries. Loose supervision was also justified for reasons of resource management 
within the banking supervision of the CEC5, as the transformation crisis and 
corporate bankruptcy in large numbers was characteristic of domestic banks. 
Naturally, foreign banks with no inherited portfolios (greenfield banks) or those that 
had been purchased (privatised) subsequent to consolidation by the state–and 
occasionally with state guarantees–bore lower risks than domestic banks. Favourable 
regulation and looser supervision, coupled with more liberal licensing and a 
privatisation practice that was more attractive for foreigners, gave a considerable 
regulatory impetus to foreign banks to increase their involvement in the CEC5 region 
                                                          
9 In this study the regulatory system’s development is depicted through the milestones marked out in 
the Basel Committee’s published recommendations. However, the European Union regulates its 
Member States in directives. In terms of content, the corresponding EU directives are generally very 
similar to the Basel recommendations, and are incorporated in the EU legislation either simultaneously 
or with a slight delay. This process is also indicative of the fact that banking rules are increasingly 
consistent at the international level. 
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and made a contribution that can be considered massive even in an international 
comparison. 
 
By now, regulatory and supervisory advantages have practically disappeared, and any 
possibly remaining ones will disappear at the moment of accession to the European 
Union. From that moment on, however, the uniform regulation applicable to the 
single EU market will add considerable stability to the banking market of the CEC5, 
just as in the case of other Member States. Owing in large part to these advantages, 
increasing integration and enhanced foreign involvement can be evidenced in the 
single European banking market ever since its evolution. In the case of the CEC5, 
owing to the current substantial foreign share, the incentive power of weak regulation 
is unlikely to be replaced by the incentive power of a uniform regulation in the 
promotion of integration. However the advantages inherent in a uniform regulation 
can be assumed to be conducive to a continuing high rate of foreign presence in 
banking. 
 
III.2. The main characteristics of foreign banks 
 
III.2.1. Foreign owners by countries 
 
In each of the five countries, the foreign owners of banks are primarily banks of EU 
Member States. More specifically, it is not infrequent that the banks of neighbouring 
countries have a prominent share. Just as Scandinavian countries are the largest 
investors in the Baltic states, for instance, Austrian banks are the most significant 
participants in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. 
 
In the Czech Republic, most of the capital (33.2% of the total registered capital of the 
banking sector) comes from Austria, French capital accounts for 17.2% of the 
registered capital; Germany’s 7.8% share in the banking sector is also significant; 
while 5.9% of the capital was contributed by Belgium. In the Slovak Republic, the 
majority of capital comes from Luxembourg (with a 30% share in the registered 
capital) and Austria (29%). Slovakia is the only country among the CEC5 where other 
countries from the region hold ownership stakes in banks, as Czech and Hungarian 
banks have acquired ownership shares in the banking sector there. In the Polish 
banking sector, Germany has the largest share (19% of the total assets), followed by 
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Italy (15%) and the USA (9%). Based on direct holdings, the largest European 
shareholders in Hungary include Austria (24% of registered capital), the Netherlands 
(14%), Germany (13%), Belgium (12%), Luxembourg (9%) and France (4%). The 
USA has a 12% share. In Slovenia, all foreign investments in the banking sector are 
limited to a narrow range of EU Member States (Austria, Italy, France and Belgium). 
Non-European countries are almost absent in the CEC5, with some US banks as the 
only the exceptions. 
 
III.2.2. Foreign owners by banks 
 
There is a high degree of overlap observable among investor banks in the CEC5 
countries. The most important investors include: the KBC Bank (Belgium), the Erste 
Bank (Austria) and the HVB Group (Germany). Only one of the largest investors 
(Bayerische Landesbank – Germany) has a single large subsidiary in one country in 
the region. The majority of banks with ownership shares in the region have overall 
strategies relevant to this particular area, focusing on Central and Eastern Europe as a 
target market. Consequently, they generally have banks in three or four CEC5 
countries, and it is not infrequent that they establish subsidiaries in other countries of 
the Central and Eastern European region as well (see table 1). Strategy is focussed on 
market presence, while customer-oriented conduct, corresponding to the assumption 
of defensive expansion, is not characteristic. 
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Table 1: Market shares of foreign banks’ subsidiaries in the region (end-2001 
data)* 
H
un
ga
ry
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
ub
lic
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Po
la
nd
Sl
ov
en
ia
C
E
E
C
-5
 to
ta
l
C
ro
at
ia
B
ul
ga
ria
R
om
an
ia
KBC Bank 7 15 3 15 7.5
Bayerische Landesbank 9 0.2 1.2 0.1
IntesaBci 8 18 2.3 14
HVB Group 6 5 4 7 3 5.9 6 7 2
Raiffeisen 5 1 9 1 2 2.2 7 4 4
GE Capital 3 3 0.6 1.5
Citibank 3 3 3 6 4.3 3
Erste Bank 3 16 15 6.0 7
Societe Generale 9 0.4 9 3.3 5 8
UniCredito 2 8 3.9 27 19 0.5
Banking sector total assets       
(EUR bn) = 100% 36.7 87.1 21.6 136.4 17.9 299.7 20.1 6.3 12.7
Foreign banks
Market shares (%)
 
* The market shares of individual banks have been defined on the basis of the balance sheet total 
as a proportion of ownership share. Therefore, the market shares shown in the Table may be different 
from the ownership share of a given bank. (for example, K&H/KBC Hungary). 
Source: BankScope 
 
III.2.3. Entering the market: privatisation vs. greenfield investments 
 
The number of greenfield investment projects in the CEC5 is relatively low compared 
to the total number of foreign banks. In each of the five countries, greenfield 
investment was characteristic of the early stages of transformation prior to banking 
sector consolidation and privatisation. 
 
In Hungary, greenfield investment was also characteristic of the initial years of 
transition. During this period, there was no supply or demand in respect of the sale 
and purchase of major banks. In the Czech Republic, a large number of new banks 
were incorporated in the first half of the 1990s. Both domestic and foreign investors 
were granted banking licences, while the majority of new banks were locally owned. 
In Poland, most barriers to foreign investor entry were removed in 1989. Despite the 
significant tax and licensing incentives, few foreign banks were attracted to the Polish 
banking market in the period 1990-1992. In Slovenia, the majority of foreign banks 
appeared soon after the country gained independence, either by purchasing a small 
bank or founding a new institution. 
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From the second half of the 1990s in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland and 
from the early 2000s in Slovakia, foreign banks’ market penetration was carried out 
through participation in the privatisation of banks. Foreign banks often started by 
purchasing a minority share, and acquired majority ownership by raising the capital 
and purchasing further shares, often over a period of several years. It was also 
characteristic of several countries and several banks that, in the first stage of 
privatisation, the EBRD acted as a minority owner, as well as a strategic investor. In 
the period of economic transition, this reduced the risks to foreign banks and 
increased the market reputation of the purchased banks. This method contains certain 
aspects of greenfield investment (e.g. buying a domestic bank means, in most cases, a 
thorough reorganisation of the bank, building up management and IT systems from 
almost zero) as well as acquisition (as the bank gains control over another one). 
Unlike in the previously mentioned other four countries, in Slovenia there was only 
one example of entry by a foreign bank into the market through privatisation. In most 
cases, foreign banks bought existing, privately owned banks. 
 
III.2.4. The owners of the three largest banks 
 
The three largest banks of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia from among the 
CEC5 are in foreign ownership. The owners participated in the privatisation of banks 
generally as strategic investors entering at an earlier or later stage. Of these three 
countries, only Hungary has transferred the majority shareholding of one of the three 
largest banks (actually the largest one) to the ownership of foreign financial investors. 
Poland’s largest bank is still state-owned, while the second and third largest ones are 
under foreign strategic owners’ control. In this respect, Slovenia is an outlier, as its 
largest bank is in state ownership, while the second and third largest ones are in 
domestic private hands. 
 
III.2.5. Profitability and capitalisation of foreign banks 
 
The relevant literature and empirical analyses are rather divided in respect of the 
profitability of foreign banks in developing markets. In the case of the CEC5, the 
period available for comparing the profitability of foreign and domestic banks is not 
sufficiently long, as foreign banks started penetrating the market usually from the 
second half of the 1990s. During this period, a large number of domestic banks 
 22
 
 
transferred into foreign ownership as a result of privatisation, but the ensuing change 
in their profitability was reflected only with a delay. Although the overwhelming 
majority of bank crises accompanying the transformation crisis of the period are over, 
in several countries in the region there are banks, which struggle with solvency 
problems and, depending on the owner of the particular bank, this may have a 
dominant impact on the profitability of the various groups of domestic or foreign 
banks. In the relatively more homogeneous period between 1998 and 2002, ROE was 
significantly higher for foreign banks than for domestic ones than in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. In contrast with this, in Slovenia ROE was higher for 
domestic banks than for foreign banks every year. In Hungary and Poland, foreign 
banks alternated with domestic banks in achieving higher ROE values (see the 
country tables in the Appendix). In general, it can be assumed that cost saving and 
stringent cost control have a positive impact on foreign banks’ profitability, even 
though the costs of bank transformations may completely offset this effect in the 
actual ROE outcomes. However, a counter-example can be quoted: the foreign banks 
active in Slovenia have a significantly higher overhead costs-to-total assets ratio than 
domestic banks. 
 
Table 2: Profitability and capital adequacy of foreign and domestic banks, 2002 
(%) 
ROE CAR  
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign 
Czech 
Republic 
-1.8 28.9 14.9 14.1 
Hungary 1.7 18.1 12.1 13.0 
Poland 8.1 4.6 11.5 14.9 
Slovak 
Republic 
0.9 31.9 24.4 21.1 
Slovenia 14.9 5.1 12.1 11.2 
Source: National Central Banks. 
 
Generally speaking, foreign banks are very well outfitted with capital. In line with 
their active market strategies, foreign owners provide sufficient funds to cover the 
capital requirement of growth for their banks in CEC5 markets. A comparison of the 
levels of capitalisation between foreign and domestic banks gives a similarly mixed 
picture. For instance, in Poland the capital adequacy ratio was considerably higher for 
foreign banks than for domestic ones between 1998 and 2002. In the Czech Republic, 
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foreign banks were also significantly better capitalised than domestic banks between 
1995 and 1999. However, the situation changed between 2000 and 2002: in the wake 
of the stabilisation of domestic banks’ capital position and powerful business 
expansion by foreign banks, the CAR of domestic banks exceeded the corresponding 
figure for foreign banks. In Slovakia, consolidation of the banking sector, which 
followed the transformation crisis, was finished only at the beginning of the new 
millennium and, as a result, the previously negative value of CAR registered by 
domestic banks between 1998 and 1999, has been continuously improving since 2000. 
Meanwhile, foreign banks have been equipped with consistently high levels of capital. 
In Slovenia, foreign banks were significantly better capitalised than domestic banks in 
1998-1999. Their CAR figures evidenced that their owners even provided temporary 
excess capital in anticipation of the capital needs of a subsequent market expansion. 
However, the pick-up in the activity of foreign banks resulted in an elimination of 
differences by 2002. The same developments had already taken place in Hungary, 
where the period between 1998 and 2002 was characterised by similar levels of 
capitalisation for domestic and foreign banks. In summary, it may be assumed that by 
2002 the CAR of foreign and domestic banks had achieved similar levels throughout 
the CEC5 region (see Table 2). 
 
III.3. The role of foreign banks 
 
III.3.1. Direct foreign ownership 
Foreign bank participation in the banking sectors of the CEC5 is much more 
pronounced than within the EU. This is clearly reflected by the ownership structure 
characterising the banking sectors of the CEC5. In 2000, the contribution of foreign 
capital to the banking sector’s registered capital already exceeded 50% in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland (see Table 3). In the following two years, this 
proportion continued to grow. In Slovakia, foreign participation picked up speed 
between 2000-2002, resulting in the banking sector with the highest level of foreign 
ownership in the region by the end of 2002. In Slovenia, the year of massive changes 
in ownership structure was 2002, when the proportion of foreign capital doubled in a 
single year. However, the level of foreign ownership continues to be much less 
characteristic than in the other four countries (see Table 4). 
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Table 3: Ownership structure of commercial banks as a proportion of registered 
capital, 2000 (%) 
 State 
ownership 
Other 
domestic 
Domestic 
ownership 
total 
Foreign 
ownership 
Dispersed 
holdings 
Czech Rep. 23.6 21.9 45.5 54.5  
Hungary 19.3 13.1 32.4 67.6  
Poland 14.9 17.4 32.3 56.6 11.1 
Slovakia 50.9 21.0 71.9 28.1  
Slovenia 36.8 51.2 88 12  
Source: ECB (2001) 
 
Table 4 Foreign ownership as a proportion of registered capital, 2002(%) 
Czech Republic 81.9 
Hungary 78 
Poland 60.5 
Slovakia 85.3 
Slovenia 32.5 
Source: National Central Banks 
 
The number of foreign banks significantly exceeds that of domestic banks in the 
region, except in Slovenia. Generally, the foreign owners have majority stakes in the 
banks, while minority participation is not typical. Due to the relevant regulation and 
the method of privatisation, a common feature of the Hungarian, Polish and Slovak 
banking systems was that foreign banks set up operations and entered the market via 
subsidiaries in the framework of bank privatisation or greenfield investment, while 
opening new branches played a secondary, if not negligible, role. A little differently 
from 1992, the Czech Banking Act gave an impetus to establish foreign branches as 
well. As a result, the number of branches in Czech Republic is more than double that 
in the other four countries taken together (see Table 5). In Slovenia, there was only 
one example of entry by a foreign bank into the market through privatisation. In most 
cases, foreign banks bought existing, privately owned banks. 
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Table 5: Number of banks by ownership, 2002 
 All 
banks 
Domestic 
owned 
Foreign 
subsidiaries 
Foreign 
branches 
Banks with foreign 
participation* 
Czech 
Rep. 
37 5 17 9 6 
Hungary 33 7 26 0 0 
Poland 59 11 44 1 3 
Slovakia 18 3 13 2 0 
Slovenia 20 11 5 1 3 
* More than 5% and less than 50 % foreign owned. 
Source: National Central Banks. 
 
In the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, the activities of foreign banks 
are even more dominant than the ownership structure suggests. This is the result of 
the remaining minority domestic ownership in predominantly foreign-owned banks. 
As a consequence, today the banking sector of the four countries in question can be 
treated as fully foreign dominated. In this respect, the outlier country is Slovenia, 
where foreign banks’ share of total assets is about one half of their ownership interest 
(see Table 6). There is no significant difference in risk appetite of foreign and 
domestic banks: the share of private credit in their balance sheet total is about the 
same in each country. 
 
Table 6: Foreign banks’ activities in the commercial banking sectors, 2002 
 Commercial 
banks' 
assets to 
GDP 
Foreign 
banks' 
assets to 
GDP 
Commercial 
banks' 
private credit 
to GDP 
Foreign banks' 
private credit 
to GDP 
Foreign banks' 
assets as a % of 
commercial 
banks assets 
Czech 
Republic 
110.0 94.4 32.9 29.1 85.8 
Hungary 54.0 49 26.5 23.5 90.7 
Poland 57.3 40.7 22.1 16.6 70.9 
Slovakia 94.5 90.3 30.8 29.6 95.6 
Slovenia 79.8 14.6 37.2 7.3 16.9 
Source: National Central Banks 
 
III.3.2. Cross-border banking activity 
 
In addition to direct foreign ownership in the banking sector, foreign banks participate 
on CEC5 markets through cross-border activity as well.10 In accordance with the open 
                                                          
10 In respect to cross-border activity the figures in Tables 7 and 8 contain some double counting. In the 
case of subsidiaries of BIS reporting banks incorporated in CEC5 and consolidated with the mother 
institutions the data in the tables refers not only to cross-border activity but to the consolidated activity 
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economy character of the CEC5 countries, foreign banks’ cross-border activities in 
these countries are quite substantial (see Table 7). Direct foreign bank lending to the 
corporate sector accounts for about 38%-58% of claims abroad, while interbank 
lending is lower in the range of 20% to 40%. 
In a breakdown by country, foreign bank claims on the CEC5 countries are highly 
concentrated. The six EU countries listed in Table 8 account for 75%-90% of the 
claims on these countries. Naturally, banks from the same six countries are also 
strongly represented as owners in the CEC5 countries. 
Table 7: Sectoral breakdown of claims of BIS reporting banks on individual 
countries (US$ millions),* 2002 
Banks            Public Sector    Non-bank private sector  Unallocated   
Czech Republic 14,092 4,638 559 7,609 1,286
Hungary 23,462 7,545 7,006 8,911 0
Poland 32,657 6,335 7,492 18,801 29
Slovak Republic 5,223 1,522 1,183 2,476 42
Slovenia 5,625 2,204 997 2,422 2
Claims vis-á-vis
Sectors
Consolidated cross-border claims in all currencies and local claims in non-
local currencies
Total       
 
* EUR/USD exchange rate for 31 December 2002: 1.05. 
Source: BIS (2003). 
 
Table 8: Country breakdown of claims of foreign banks on CEC5 countries (in 
%) 
Claims vis-á-vis Austria  Belgium France Germany Italy Neitherlands EU(6)
Czech Republic 6,72 36,78 13,96 25,57 0,83 5,62 89,47
Hungary 5,76 15,84 3,42 44,17 9,39 4,12 82,70
Poland 4,61 9,94 3,09 28,79 18,86 10,11 75,40
Slovak Republic 7,19 13,08 4,48 15,91 42,40 6,56 89,62
Slovenia 12,71 6,35 20,86 39,08 4,89 1,43 85,33  
Source: BIS (2003). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
of local banks, as well. Consequently, on the basis of BIS statistics one can evaluate only the trends and 
proportions of cross-border banking activity and not the concrete figures. 
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IV. The role of foreign banks in the European Union 
 
Regulation of the banking systems of the European Union is based on the ‘Single 
European Passport’ principle, which implies that European banks are authorised to 
freely offer financial services in any member country of the EU. Banking regulations 
in the European Union have been adopted and used compulsorily by a number of 
other European nations, in addition to the Member States of the EU. These countries 
include the former EFTA members, Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland, except 
Switzerland. The Single European Banking Passport and prudential supervision of 
banks based on home country control are equally applied to banks in these countries 
and in the EU. The EU and the three countries noted above together comprise the 
European Economic Area (EEA). Its importance for accession countries is explained 
by the fact that, legally, the domestic banking markets will open for banks of the EEA 
countries at the time of joining the EU. 
The next section presents the activities of banks of the European Union abroad and 
the presence of foreign banks on the markets of the member states both in form of 
cross-border entry and building up branches and establishing subsidiaries abroad. 
IV.1. Cross-border banking 
 
Cross-border activities of European banks are much more dominated by interbank 
transactions than lending and accepting deposits (see Table 9). Foreign lending 
accounts for 40% of total interbank lending. This compares with only 11% in the case 
of non-bank assets. In addition, liabilities from foreign banks account for 47% of 
European banks' total interbank liabilities, in contrast with an only 16% share of 
foreign non-bank liabilities. 
In contrast to interbank market, cross-border lending to costumers (especially to 
households and SMEs) is not characteristic at all, as close proximity to customers is 
of key importance. The increasing popularity of state-of-the-art distribution channels 
has not yet jeopardised this tendency: households continue to establish Internet and 
phone banking connections with well-known local banks. The main focus of EU 
banks' cross-border activities remains the corporate and private banking segments. 
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Between 1997 and 2001, cross-border lending rose slightly more strongly than 
banking activities: lending by banks to euro area customers rose from 2.2% to 3.4% as 
a proportion of the total, lending to non-euro area customers rising from 6.2% to 
7.7%. This change in the ratios indicates that corporate lending has grown 
increasingly international. However, there have recently been opposing trends in 
respect of deposits collected from abroad. The percentage share of euro area deposits 
accepted from abroad has fallen slightly within banks' total deposits, while that of 
deposits collected from outside the euro area has increased quite robustly. Explanation 
for this is that confidence in domestic banks of the European Union has strengthened, 
and depositing abroad has become less attractive. This higher confidence is also 
characteristic of countries outside the euro area, which has made it attractive for 
foreign depositors as well to make deposits in euro area banks. 
 
Table 9: Domestic and cross-border activities of euro area banks 
Per cent December 2001 
ASSETS  
Interbank lending  
Domestic 
Euro area 
Outside euro area 
 
59.3 
18.3 
22.4 
Other banking assets (e.g. securities) 
Domestic 
Euro area 
Outside euro area 
 
63.8 
19.5 
16.7 
Non-bank assets 
Domestic 
Euro area 
Outside euro area 
 
88.9 
3.4 
7.7 
Non-bank bonds 
Domestic 
Euro area 
Outside euro area 
 
53.3 
29.3 
17.7 
LIABILITIES  
Interbank deposits 
Domestic 
From euro area 
From outside euro area 
 
52.9 
16.4 
30.7 
Non-bank deposits 
Domestic 
From euro area 
From outside euro area 
 
84.3 
5.0 
10.7 
Source: ECB (2002/a). 
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IV.2. The role of foreign branches 
 
IV.2.1. Presence of foreign branches in countries of the European Union 
 
Closely related to EU banks focusing primarily on lending and accepting deposits 
locally, a strong presence of foreign banks' branches is not characteristic in the 
member states of European Monetary Union (EMU). As is shown in Table 10, the 
market share of foreign banks with the single European licence as a proportion of the 
balance sheet total is generally less than 5% in the banking markets of EMU. 
European banks only have market shares above 10% in Ireland and Luxembourg. The 
number of foreign branches is high in Germany, although associated with a low 
market share. However, increasing integration is also observable in respect of bank 
branches: the average number of foreign branches rose from 34 to 42 and their 
average market share from 4.7% to 5.7% between 1997 and 2000. Although not 
shown in Table 10, the United Kingdom’s banking market is significantly different 
from those of the other members of the European Union: foreign branches are 
dominant participants of the UK banking market. In 2001, the balance sheet total of 
the branches of EEA-country banks in the UK accounted for 23.7% of domestic 
banks' balance sheet total. 
Table 10: EU banks' foreign branches in countries of the EU, 2000 
 Number of 
branches 
Assets of foreign branches as a proportion 
of total unconsolidated assets of host 
country 
Host country From the 
euro area 
From the 
EU 
From the EU. Italics denote percentage 
shares of assets from the EEA 
Austria 12 15 0.8 
Belgium 28 34 5.7 
Finland 0 0 7.3 
France 73 93 3.3 
Germany 113 145 1.3 
Greece 9 13 6.4 
Ireland N/A N/A 13.5 
Italy 32 41 3.5 
Luxembourg 47 55 16.6 
Netherlands 0 0 2.7 
Portugal 18 22 4.2 
Spain 33 41 3.4 
Euro area 
average 
  5.7 
Source: ECB (2002/a). 
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Third-country bank branches outside the EEA play an even smaller role in the EU 
banking market. Their market share is only high in the UK (20.9% of domestic banks' 
balance sheet total in 2001). By contrast, showing a declining trend, market share had 
fallen below 1% in the rest of the EU countries by 2001. The market share of third-
country bank branches relative to the average of domestic banks of EMU dropped 
from 1.4% in 1997 to 0.6% in 2001.11 
Usually, foreign bank branches make a choice between two major options for 
establishing business in the European Union: cross-border bank mergers and 
formation of own branches. Bank mergers in the EU are characterised by mergers 
within one country and less so by cross-border mergers. Expansion to countries 
outside the EU is more dominant via cross-border M&A activities. Opportunities to 
earn high profits in countries with less advanced banking markets attract banks mainly 
to Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe.12 Nevertheless, a typical way of 
setting up branches abroad is bank mergers. Establishing branches individually is less 
common. 
 
IV.2.2. Presence of EU banks in other member states' markets through branches 
 
In line with the modest presence of foreign bank branches in the markets of EU 
Member States, establishment of branches of EU banks in other member states is 
moderate (see Table 11). Activities abroad of branches registered in other EMU 
countries account for only 6.6% on average of the consolidated balance sheet total of 
EU-country banks. In the period from 1997 to 2000, EMU banks strongly stepped up 
their market presence in the EU: their activities conducted through branches in the EU 
accounted for only 1% compared with their banking activities in the domestic market 
in 1997. Against this background, the 6.6% percentage share in 2000 is evidence of a 
substantial increase in integration among banks. Reflecting the fact that the UK is a 
primary target country for setting up bank branches, euro area banks' presence in 
other countries of the area lags considerably behind this ratio, accounting for 0.9% in 
1997 and for 0.7% in 2000 relative to their domestic banking activities. Business 
activities of German and Dutch banks' foreign branches rose particularly strongly in 
the period. For example, German banks' branches domiciled in the EU increased their 
                                                          
11 Source: Bikker and Wesselig (2003). 
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activities from 0.2% to 15.1% as a proportion of their consolidated balance sheet total, 
Dutch banks' branches increased their activities from 2.9% to 16.6%. (Illustrating 
these two countries' UK orientation, the share of German banks' branches in the euro 
area was only 0.4% as a percentage of the balance sheet total, that of Dutch banks' 
branches being 1.6% in 2000.) 
 
Table 11: Banking by EU banks in other EU countries via foreign branches, 2000 
 Number of 
branches 
Balance sheet totals of foreign branches as a proportion of 
consolidated balance sheet total of the home country* 
Home country Euro 
area 
EU Euro area EU 
Austria 14 17 0.3 3.5 
Belgium 23 28 0.4 5.0 
Finland 1 2 0 0 
France 68 83 2.0 7.4 
Germany 83 109 0.4 15.1 
Greece 6 11 0.3 9.9 
Ireland 7 16 0.2 9.0 
Italy 41 57 0.9 5.6 
Luxembourg 39 40 0 0.0 
Netherlands 35 44 1.6 16.6 
Portugal 12 16 0.4 3.0 
Spain 36 42 2.2 4.3 
Euro area average   0.7 6.6 
*The data only include claims by the following countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden and England. 
Source: ECB (2002/a). 
 
 
IV.3. The role of foreign subsidiaries 
 
In the market of the European Union, foreign subsidiaries owned by banks domiciled 
within the EEA are on the whole slightly more active in the provision of banking 
services than bank branches (see Table 12). 
                                                                                                                                                                      
12 For more details, see ECB (2000). 
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Table 12: Market shares of foreign subsidiaries, 2001 
Host country Number of 
subsidiaries from 
EEA countries 
Assets of foreign subsidiaries from EEA countries as a 
proportion of total assets of domestic banks 
Austria 16 18.2 
Belgium 22 18.8 
Finland 0 0 
France 105 7.8 
Germany 21 1.8 
Greece 2 8.2 
Ireland 27 27.9 
Italy 7 1.1 
Luxembourg 89 69.3 
Netherlands 14 7.6 
Portugal 9 12.1 
Spain 44 4 
Sweden N/A N/A 
England 17 1.2 
EU average  6.8 
Euro area average  8.6 
Source: Bikker and Wesseling and ECB (2002/b). 
 
Within the EU, it varies from country to country whether foreign banks conduct their 
operations through branches or subsidiaries. Preferences for the type of organisational 
unit to be applied in the different countries depend on a combination of factors. 
Generally speaking, branches predominantly provide their services in corporate 
financing, trade financing and private banking. Furthermore, branches in a foreign 
country often cater to the needs of their home country clients. By contrast, services for 
retail customers are more likely to be provided by the local branch network of banks, 
that have set up their own subsidiaries. In addition to the type of banking services, 
another factor strongly influencing preferences is differences in the regulatory 
framework, particularly accounting and taxation rules or the deposit insurance system. 
In England, for instance, both the number and balance sheet total of branches are 
several times higher than those of subsidiaries, while it is the other way round in 
Luxembourg, where subsidiaries outscore branches by far. In a number of countries, 
for instance in Austria, Belgium and France, foreign subsidiaries are considerably 
larger than branches, and these subsidiaries, which are either as many or fewer in 
number, tend to be more active than the registered branches. However, this is not the 
case everywhere. In Germany, for instance, for a similar market share, the number of 
branches considerably exceeds that of subsidiaries. 
On the whole, the combined participation in the form of branches and subsidiaries of 
registered EU-owned foreign banks varies widely even across the banking market of 
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the EU countries. Luxembourg, with its very favourable tax system, appears to be a 
unique country with a nearly 90% market share of foreign branches and subsidiaries 
in the balance sheet total of the country’s banking sector. By contrast, the 
corresponding ratio is below 5% in Germany and Italy. Typical values are in the range 
of 10% to 25%. 
V. Conclusions 
 
The CEC5 countries have witnessed an exceptionally high degree of foreign bank 
penetration. At the beginning of the 1990s these countries had inefficient, 
underdeveloped banking sectors. The entry of foreign banks has helped to recapitalise 
troubled domestic banks, to improve the quality and quantity of financial services, to 
spread technology and know-how, to exert competitive pressure on domestic banks. 
Foreign banks played a very important role in the development of a modern banking 
sector in the region. They did not only follow their customers, but were also attracted 
by the host county opportunities. Although at the early stage of entry their activity and 
clientele were rather limited to certain market segments, in many countries they now 
have expanded into the retail market as well. Foreign banks in CEC5 countries 
typically are well capitalised and show higher profitability than their domestic peers. 
The short history of foreign bank presence in the region, which coincided with the 
transition and liberalisation period, does not allow the analysis of the behaviour of 
foreign banks during crisis situations. However, the experiences of other countries 
highlight the importance of having an ownership structure diversified across 
countries, which can lower the probability and extent of contagion of home and third-
country shocks. Since the extent of foreign bank penetration is unprecedented in 
CEC5 countries, we do not know how the foreign owners would react to a serious 
crisis in the region. 
 
As to the form of entry, the number of foreign branches in the region is relatively low. 
This might change with EU accession, as existing restrictions will be lifted. In 
addition there might be incentives to turn subsidiaries into branches. For example, 
branches are supervised by home country authorities. This allows them to engage in 
larger operations, as concentration limits would depend on the much larger capital of 
parent banks. Branches may also take advantage of lower cost of funds and lower 
administrative costs. But there are some counter-incentives as well. In the case of a 
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subsidiary, it is easier to solve the problems arising during operation. The risk can be 
limited to the capital allocated directly against the activity of the subsidiary. A 
withdrawal without loss of prestige is also more manageable. Weighing the 
arguments, there are no clear expectations for the future institutional structure of 
foreign banking in CEC5 banking markets. 
 
The entry of the CEC5 countries into the EU will alter the European financial 
landscape. Foreign bank penetration will rise significantly. This renders the issue of 
foreign banking and financial integration within the European Union increasingly 
relevant. 
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VI. Appendix* 
 
 
Data for Czech Republic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* In the appendix we use the following definitions:  
• foreign banks: at least 50 % of the shares is foreign owned  
• banks with foreign participation: more than 5 % and less than 50 % foreign owned 
• domestic banks: not foreign banks 
  
in %
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1.  Commercial bank1) average assets as % of GDP 120 113,1 119 113,0 111,0 113,6 114,9 110,0
2.  Private credit by commercial banks1)/2) as % of GDP 58,6 54,3 56,7 52,3 46,1 41,0 36,4 32,9
3.  Commercial banks1) assets to total financial assets n.a 77,1 80,9 80,4 78,6 79,5 79,4 78,3
4.  Foreign banks3) assets as % of GDP 20 23,7 30 31,8 46,5 81,9 102,4 94,4
5.  Private credit2) by foreign banks as % of GDP 6,9 8,4 11 11,7 17,9 30,4 33,3 29,1
6.  Foreign banks assets as share of commercial bank1 assets 16,6 20,9 25,2 28,1 41,9 72,1 89,1 85,8
7.  Number of foreign and domestic banks
 a) foreign banks3) 23 23 24 25 27 26 26 26
 b) domestic banks 31 24 21 19 14 12 11 11
8.  Number of foreign subsidiaries 13 14 15 15 17 16 16 17
9.  Number of foreign branches 10 9 9 10 10 10 10 9
10.  Number of banks with foreign participation 13 11 10 10 7 6 5 6
11. Return on average assets (ROAA) of foreign and domestic banks
 a) foreign banks 0,70 0,60 0,91 0,62 0,72 0,88 0,73 1,30
 b) domestic banks -0,62 0,28 -0,57 -0,89 -0,93 0,14 0,62 -0,09
12. Return on average equity4) (ROAE) od foreign and domestic banks
 a) foreign banks 45,2 36,7 57,6 10,6 10,1 18,0 16,9 28,9
 b) domestic banks -27,8 9,5 -18,5 -12,8 -16,3 2,4 10,8 -1,8
13. Net interest margin (NIM) of foreign and domestic banks
 a) foreign banks 2,03 1,61 0,99 2,2 2,08 2,33 2,71 2,6
 b) domestic banks 3,02 2,27 2,56 3,92 3,33 3,05 1,94 1,65
14. Overhead costs as share of average total assets of foreign and 
 a) foreign banks 1,82 1,44 1,35 1,64 1,82 1,89 2,1 1,99
 b) domestic banks 2,06 2,11 2,11 2,17 2,15 2,06 1,41 1,45
15. Capital adequacy for foreign and domestic banks
 a) foreign banks 16,25 14,97 15,14 17,32 18,59 14,53 15,09 14,06
 b) domestic banks 8,30 8,56 8,70 10,84 11,45 15,52 17,99 14,91
16. Non-performing loans as share of total loans for domestic and foreign 
 a) foreign banks 3,0 2,4 2,7 6,1 11,8 16,6 14,2 8,8
 b) domestic banks 30,0 27,0 25,3 24,8 27,8 27,3 9,0 10,0
Coverage of weighted classification5) with reserves and provisions
 a) foreign banks 133,0 154,9 168,2 131,4 69,7 53,2 82,6 112,8
 b) domestic banks 57,3 50,0 54,1 60,3 58,4 65,1 70,4 73,9
1/ For banks with licences as of the given date (excluding Konsolidaci banka and banks under conservatorship).
2/ To/from enterprises, MSEs and households.
3/ Inculding foreign branches.
4/ Net profit (loss) / average Tier I. 
Note: For banks with licences as of the given date (excluding Konsolidacni banka and banks under conservatorship).
5/ Weighted classification according the CNB Provision (5 % wathc loasns, 20 % substandard loans, 
50 % doubtful loans 100 % loss. 
Note: For banks with licences as of the given date (excluding Konsolidacni banka and banks under conservatorship).
Source: National Bank of Czech Republic
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Data for Hungary 
 
in %
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1.  Commercial bank average assets as % of GDP 57,0  57,0  57,2  56,0  53,3  
2.  Private* credit by commercial banks as % of GDP 22,1  23,1  26,2  26,7  26,5  
3.  Commercial banks assets to total financial assets 85,9  82,6  77,3  74,1  71,8  
4.  Foreign banks assets as % of GDP 35,4  37,7  39,8  39,4  49,0  
5.  Private credit by foreign banks as % of GDP 15,0  23,1  26,2  26,7  26,5  
6.  Foreign banks assets as share of commercial banks assets 62,5  68,3  70,1  70,0  90,7  
7.  Number of foreign and domestic banks 38  37  36  35  33  
8.  Number of foreign subsidiaries 27  29  30  29  26  
9.  Number of foreign branches 0  0  0  0  0  
10.  Number of banks with foreign participation 3  1  1  1  0  
11.  Return on assets (ROA) of foreign and domestic banks
 a) foreign banks 0,7  0,0  0,9  1,4  1,5  
 b) domestic banks -5,9  1,1  1,4  1,5  0,2  
12.  Return on equity (ROE) od foreign and domestic banks
 a) foreign banks 7,7  -0,2  10,8  16,9  18,1  
 b) domestic banks -96,2  17,8  18,9  20,2  1,7  
13.  Net interest margin of foreign and domestic banks
 a) foreign banks 4,4  3,6  3,6  3,8  4,1  
 b) domestic banks 5,0  5,0  4,8  5,1  5,0  
14.
 Overhead costs as share of average total assets of foreign and 
domestic banks
 a) foreign banks 3,9  4,0  3,7  3,7  3,6  
 b) domestic banks 4,3  4,1  4,0  4,1  4,8  
15.  Capital adequacy for foreign and domestic banks
 a) foreign banks 15,8  13,8  13,0  13,7  13,0  
 b) domestic banks 13,7  15,2  16,1  13,9  12,1  
* Loans to non-financial enterprises and households
Source: National Bank of Hungary
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Data for Poland 
 
 
 
 
 
in %
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1.  Commercial bank average assets as % of GDP 55,1 56,6 59,9 59,7 57,4
2.  Private credit by commercial banks as % of GDP 16,1 19,5 21,5 22,2 22,1
3.  Commercial banks assets to total financial assets 87,9 86,1 83,3 80,6 75,6
4.  Foreign banks assets as % of GDP 9,6 27,9 43,5 43,0 40,7
5.  Private credit by foreign banks as % of GDP 4,1 10,1 15,5 16,6 16,6
6.  Foreign banks assets as share of commercial banks assets 17,4 49,3 72,6 72,1 70,9
7.  Number of foreign and domestic banks 83 77 73 69 59
8.  Number of foreign subsidiaries 29 36 37 45 44
9.  Number of foreign branches 3 3 2 1 1
10.  Number of banks with foreign participation 14 8 4 3 3
11.  Return on assets (ROA) of foreign and domestic banks
 a) foreign banks 2,0 1,1 1,3 0,9 0,5
 b) domestic banks 0,3 0,9 0,6 0,9 0,4
12.  Return on equity (ROE) od foreign and domestic banks
 a) foreign banks 18,2 11,1 15,1 9,9 4,6
 b) domestic banks 5,4 13,1 10,3 21,1 8,1
13.  Net interest margin of foreign and domestic banks 4,7 4,0 4,0 3,5 3,3
14.  Overhead costs as share of total assets of foreign and domestic banks 3,7 3,6 3,7 3,7 3,4
15.  Capital adequacy for foreign and domestic banks
 a) foreign banks 15,0 15,0 13,9 16,0 14,9
 b) domestic banks 10,7  11,2  9,7  11,7  11,5  
16. portfolio quality for domestic  banks 10,5 14,3 14,4 17,2 19,6
portfolio quality for foreign banks 12,0 13,3 15,9 19,1 22,7
Source: National Bank of Poland
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Data for Slovak Republic 
 
 
 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1. Commercial bank assets as percentage of GDP (%) 114,00 109,63 102,74 92,11 93,19 93,89 94,45
2. Private credit by commercial banks as percentage of GDP (%) 58,74 53,93 51,20 48,21 44,03 32,82 30,83
3. Commercial banks assets  to total financial assets1/ (%) 95,28 94,88 94,33 93,90 93,93 93,31 91,83
4. Foreign banks assets as percentage of GDP (%) 27,47 33,42 34,35 30,09 39,19 84,36 90,26
5. Private credit by foreign banks as percentage of GDP (%) 10,82 11,34 10,86 12,21 16,59 25,25 29,63
6. Foreign bank assets as share of commercial banks assets (%) 24,10 30,48 33,43 32,67 42,06 89,85 95,56
7. Number of foreign banks 15 14 12 11 14 15 17
8. Number of domestic banks 14 15 15 14 9 6 3
9. Number of foreign subsidiaries 8 8 7 7 10 11 13
10. Number of foreign branches 5 4 2 2 2 2 2
11. Number of banks with foreign participation 4 4 6 4 2 0 0
12. Return on assets (ROE) of domestic banks (%) -0,65 -0,76 -1,40 -6,26 -0,42 -1,28 0,07
                                           foreign banks (%) 0,41 1,30 1,44 1,09 1,88 1,32 1,21
13. Return on equity (ROE) of domestic banks (%) -18,12 -20,65 -33,43 -79,41 -5,21 -6,14 0,93
                                           foreign banks (%) 10,83 36,38 52,68 31,25 56,42 30,97 31,90
14. Net interest margin of domestic banks (%) -0,24 1,11 -0,16 -1,18 0,69 0,74 2,47
                                          foreign banks (%) 1,52 3,49 3,82 3,98 3,46 2,50 2,70
15. Overhead costs as share of total assets of domestic banks (%) 2,18 2,61 2,81 2,74 2,54 2,89 2,22
                                          foreign banks (%) 1,89 1,56 1,73 2,27 2,32 2,30 2,41
16. Capital adequacy for domestic banks (%) x 2,34 -0,99 -0,56 13,03 16,07 24,43
                                          foreign banks (%) x 20,89 19,73 20,45 11,89 20,43 21,09
17. Portfolio quality2/ for domestic banks (%) 34,07 36,43 41,31 36,13 29,85 49,93 14,90
                                          foreign banks (%) 11,23 30,69 35,51 30,28 22,71 28,59 20,72
1/ In years 1996-2001 financial sector represent banking and insurance companies assets only.
2/ Classified loand to total loans.
x - data not available
Source: National Bank of Slovak Republic
 39
 
 
 
 
Data for Slovenia 
 
in %
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1.  Commercial bank average assets as % of GDP 65,4  67,7  67,8  72,4  78,5  
2.  Private credit by commercial banks as % of GDP 30,9  34,6  35,2  37,0  37,2  
3.  Commercial banks assets to total financial assets 67,4  66,3  68,8  71,2  72,2  
4.  Foreign banks assets as % of GDP 3,5  3,5  11,4  12,5  14,6  
5.  Private credit by foreign banks as % of GDP 1,0  1,5  6,1  6,1  7,3  
6.  Foreign banks assets as share of commercial banks assets 4,9  4,9  15,3  15,2  16,9  
7.  Number of foreign and domestic banks 24  25  25  21  20  
 a) foreign banks 3  5  6  5  6  
 b) domestic banks 21  20  19  16  14  
8.  Number of foreign subsidiaries 3  4  5  4  5  
9.  Number of foreign branches 0  1  1  1  1  
10.  Number of banks with foreign participation 3  3  2  3  3  
11.  Return on assets (ROA) od foreign and domestic banks 1,2  0,8  1,1  0,5  1,1  
 a) foreign banks 0,7  -0,1  0,2  -3,9  0,4  
 b) domestic banks 1,2  0,9  1,3  1,2  1,3  
12.  Return on equity (ROE) od foreign and domestic banks 11,3  7,8  11,4  4,8  13,3  
 a) foreign banks 6,7  -0,8  1,5  -39,5  5,1  
 b) domestic banks 11,5  8,4  13,2  12,9  14,9  
13.  Net interest margin of foreign and domestic banks 4,6  4,1  4,7  3,6  3,7  
 a) foreign banks 3,8  3,3  3,7  3,1  3,3  
 b) domestic banks 1,3  4,2  4,9  3,7  3,8  
14.
 Overhead costs as share of average total assets of foreign and 
domestic banks 2,4  2,4  2,8  2,6  2,4  
 a) foreign banks 2,4  3,1  3,7  3,9  2,9  
 b) domestic banks 2,4  2,4  2,6  2,3  2,4  
15.  Capital adequacy for foreign and domestic banks 16,0  14,0  13,5  11,9  11,9  
 a) foreign banks 30,8  28,8  14,3  12,3  11,2  
 b) domestic banks 15,4  13,2  13,3  11,9  12,1  
Source: National Bank of Slovenia
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